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Resort to the record, including the parties Stipulation of Facts, further confuses the matter. It is my firm conviction that no Member of the Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed with todays decision. For the dissent, in contrast, individualized scrutiny is simply beside the point. Post, at 55. different school zones are paired together and, as a result, all students at a certain grade level attend school in the same school building). The allocation of governmental burdens and benefits, contentious under any circumstances, is even more divisive when allocations are made on the basis of individual racial classifications. 05908, at 137a139a. Consequently, the Courts decision today slows down and sets back the work of local school boards to bring about racially diverse schools. of Jefferson Cty., Nos. Studies suggest that children taken from those schools and placed in integrated settings often show positive academic gains. . For the purpose of this section, racial imbalance shall be deemed to exist when the per cent of nonwhite students in any public school is in excess of fifty per cent of the total number of students in such school. 352 Mass., at 695, 227 N.E. 2d, at 731. The dissent refers to an opinion filed by Judge Kozinski in one of the cases now before us, and that opinion relied upon an opinion filed by Chief Judge Boudin in a case presenting an issue similar to the one here. Am. [I]ntegration, we are told, has three essential elements. Ibid. The third tiebreaker was the distance from the students home to the school, and the final tiebreaker was a lottery, which was seldom used. (citing Brief for Respondents, O.T. 1984, No. 05-908, was filed by a group of parents who had formed a nonprofit corporation to. The dissents reliance on this interest is, therefore, inconsistent with Wygant. As the Court recently reaffirmed, racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and classification. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, 270 (2003) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); brackets omitted). Second, if the schools racial make-up was more than 15 percent out of line with the overall racial composition of the school district (classified only as white and nonwhite), then the students race was considered. We described the various types of diversity that the law school sought: [The law schools] policy makes clear there are many possible bases for diversity admissions, and provides examples of admittees who have lived or traveled widely abroad, are fluent in several languages, have overcome personal adversity and family hardship, have exceptional records of extensive community service, and have had successful careers in other fields. Id., at 338 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Thomas also rejected the view advanced by the dissent that these school districts were in danger of resegregation. 05915, at 410. What about historically black colleges, which have established traditions and programs that might disproportionately appeal to one race or another? Race-conscious objectives to achieve diverse school environment may be acceptable. ), I shall adopt the first alternative. 1996) (Perhaps desegregation does not have a single effect, positive or negative, on the academic achievement of African American students, but rather some strategies help, some hurt, and still others make no difference whatsoever. For Brown held out a promise. v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43, 46 (1971) (no absolute prohibition against [the] use of mathematical ratios as a starting point); Swann, 402 U. S., at 2425 (approving the use of a ratio reflecting the racial composition of the whole school system as a useful starting point, but not as an inflexible requirement). Next, the dissent argues that the interest in integration has an educational element. Even in the context of mandatory desegregation, we have stressed that racial proportionality is not required, see Milliken, 433 U. S., at 280, n. 14 ([A desegregation] order contemplating the substantive constitutional right [to a] particular degree of racial balance or mixing is infirm as a matter of law (internal quotation marks omitted)); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. Transfers may be requested for any number of reasons, and may be denied because of lack of available space or on the basis of the racial guidelines. The dissent overreads Grutter, however, in suggesting that it renders pure racial balancing a constitutionally compelling interest; Grutter itself recognized that using race simply to achieve racial balance would be patently unconstitutional, 539 U. S., at 330. in No. Compare Brief for Kansas on Reargument in Brown v. Board of Education, O.T. 1953, No. The Court need not resolve the parties dispute over whether racial diversity in schools has a marked impact on test scores and other objective yardsticks or achieves intangible socialization benefits because it is clear that the racial classifications at issue are not narrowly tailored to the asserted goal. Section 4. Add to the inconclusive social science the fact of black achievement in racially isolated environments. Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. And it used busing to transport the students to their new assignments. To hold to the contrary is to transform that test from strict to fatal in factthe very opposite of what Grutter said. [Footnote 9] The Sixth Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion relying upon the reasoning of the District Court, concluding that a written opinion would serve no useful purpose. McFarland v. Jefferson Cty. See, e.g., Schofield, Review of Research on School Desegregations Impact on Elementary and Secondary School Students, in Handbook of Research on Multicultural Education 597, 606607 (J. Adarand, supra, at 227. 05908, at 103a (describing application of racial tiebreaker based on current white percentage of 41 percent and current minority percentage of 59 percent (emphasis added)). How could the plurality adopt a constitutional standard that would hold unconstitutional large numbers of race-conscious integration plans adopted by numerous school boards over the past 50 years while remaining true to this Courts desegregation precedent? Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943) ([R]acial discriminations are in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited). Yet neither of those briefs contains specific details like the magnitude of the claimed positive effects or the precise demographic mix at which those positive effects begin to be realized. This leads it to advance propositions that, in my view, are both erroneous and in fundamental conflict with basic equal protection principles. But the Court set forth in Swann a basic principle of constitutional lawa principle of law that has found wide acceptance in the legal culture. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); Mitchell v. United States, 526 U. S. 314, 330 (1999); id., at 331, 332 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing wide acceptance in the legal culture as adequate reason not to overrule prior cases). The dissents assertion that these plans are necessary for the school districts to maintain their hard-won gains reveals its conflation of segregation and racial imbalance. In order for its plan to be constitutional under strict scrutiny, the School District must show its use of race in the admission process was furthering a compelling government interest (compelling interest) and that the School District plan was the narrowest possible use of race that could achieve this interest (narrowly tailored). 2d 750 (opinion of Powell, J. of Los Angeles, 458 U. S. 527 (1982), post, at 24, in which a state referendum prohibiting a race-based assignment plan was challenged, is inappositein Crawford the Court again expressly reserved the question presented by these cases. us/summary. McDonald v. Chicago Here, the context is one in which school districts seek to advance or to maintain racial integration in primary and secondary schools. Regardless of its name, however, the interest at stake possesses three essential elements. As part of that burden it must establish, in detail, how decisions based on an individual students race are made in a challenged governmental program. And Swann, McDaniel, Crawford, North Carolina Bd. See Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown II) (At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools on a nondiscriminatory basis (emphasis added)). id., at 390 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (expressing concern about narrow fluctuation band[s]). You already receive all suggested Justia Opinion Summary Newsletters. See Regents of Univ. 16, 18. ospi. 05908, p.84a; Brief for Respondents in No. Transfer plans, for example, allowed students to shift from a school in which they were in the racial majority to a school in which they would be in a racial minority. of Ed. We granted certiorari, and now reverse. 547 U. S. __ (2006). They asked the court to dissolve the desegregation order and to hold the use of magnet school racial guidelines unconstitutional. 539 U. S., at 316, 335336. Racial imbalance is not segregation. In particular, they emphasize that the children on whose high school admissions the case was originally based have since graduated high school, while the children of the other involved parents are not yet at the high school age. The decision was a 5-4 split on the Court, with both sides claiming that their position was truest to the precedent set in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). summary.aspx?schoolId=1104&reportLevel=School&orgLinkId=1104&yrs=; 3313.98(B)(2)(b)(iii) (Lexis Supp. First, no casenot Adarand, Gratz, Grutter, or any otherhas ever held that the test of strict scrutiny means that all racial classificationsno matter whether they seek to include or excludemust in practice be treated the same. in No. At the time, however, Young Elementary was 46.8 percent black. I shall not accept the school boards assurances on faith, cf. If there were doubts before Swann was decided, they did not survive this Courts decision. When the court made this determination in 2000, it did so in the context of the Louisville desegregation plan that the board had adopted in 1996. See Part V, supra, at 5763. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886); Brown, 347 U. S. 483; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); Regents of Univ. The statement was not a technical holding in the case. The U.S. Supreme Court's recent decisions in cases involving school districts in Seattle, Washington, and Louisville, Kentucky, seem to indicate that the United States is moving away from diversity in its public schools. At the same time, these compelling interests, in my view, do help inform the present inquiry. Id., at 462. Indeed, in the context of school desegregation, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of acknowledging that local school boards better understand their own communities and have a better knowledge of what in practice will best meet the educational needs of their pupils. This refers back to a time when public schools were highly segregated, often as a result of legal or administrative policies that facilitated racial segregation in public schools. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Notwithstanding these concerns, allocation of benefits and burdens through individual racial classifications was found sometimes permissible in the context of remedies for de jure wrong. (rejecting argument that strict scrutiny should be applied only to classifications that disadvantage minorities, stating [r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination). It is clear to us that focusing simply on demographic issues detracts from focusing on improving schools). Each of these premises is, in my respectful view, incorrect. And it adjusted its alphabet-based system for grouping and busing students. On the matter of stare decisis, I submit that the duration of the challenged practice, while it is persuasive, is not controlling. If that is so, then all of Seattles earlier (even more race-conscious) plans must also have been unconstitutional. Chief Justice Burger, on behalf of a unanimous Court in a case of exceptional importance, wrote: School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. Does the Constitution mandate this inefficient result? For instance, a Texas appeals court in 1986 rejected a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a voluntary integration plan by explaining: [T]he absence of a court order to desegregate does not mean that a school board cannot exceed minimum requirements in order to promote school integration. L.Rev. The District further argues that the plan passes muster under the strictest scrutiny. And it is the pluralitys opinion, not this dissent that fails to ground the result it would reach in law. Ante, at 28. in McFarland I, at 190 (Dec. 8, 2003) (Q. Primary Documents: (Slip Opinion) December 4, 2006, Argued June 28, 2007, * Decided SYLLABUS: Respondent school districts voluntarily adopted student assignment plans that rely on race to determine which schools certain children may attend. The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all. Grutter, supra, at 353 (opinion of Thomas, J.). 05915, Meredith, Custodial Parent and Next Friend of McDonald v. Jefferson County Bd. Brief for Respondents in No. http://reportcard. At the same time, the plan provided that a previous black school would remain about 50% black, while a previous white school would remain about two-thirds white. 05908. See F. Welch & A. (a)Because racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and classification, Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting), governmental distributions of burdens or benefits based on individual racial classifications are reviewed under strict scrutiny, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 505506. Another Connecticut regulation provides that [a]ny school in which the Proportion for the School falls outside of a range from 25 percentage points less to 25 percentage points more than the Comparable Proportion for the School District, shall be determined to be racially imbalanced. Conn. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 05908, Post, at 41. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle (2007) In 2003, the Supreme Court ruled in Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger that race-based classifications, as used in affirmative-action policies, must be "narrowly tailored" to a "compelling government interest," like diversity. It simply recognizes that judges are not well suited to act as school administrators. The idea that if race is the problem, race is the instrument with which to solve it cannot be accepted as an analytical leap forward. Until today, this Court understood the Constitution as affording the people, acting through their elected representatives, freedom to select the use of race-conscious criteria from among their available options. The Jefferson County plan, however, is based on a goal of replicating at each school an African-American enrollment equivalent to the average district-wide African-American enrollment. Id., at 81. To School Committee of Boston? 2728; 476 U. S., at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). And the present context requires a court to examine carefully the race-conscious program at issue. gation without court orders); Branton, Little Rock But the district vigorously defends the constitutionality of its race-based program, and nowhere suggests that if this litigation is resolved in its favor it will not resume using race to assign students. These effects not only reinforce the prior gains of integrated primary and secondary education; they also foresee a time when there is less need to use race-conscious criteria. How do the educational and civic interests differ in kind from those that underlie and justify the racial diversity that the law school sought in Grutter, where this Court found a compelling interest? I fear the consequences of doing so for the law, for the schools, for the democratic process, and for Americas efforts to create, out of its diversity, one Nation. The district did not attempt to defend the proposition that anything outside its range posed the specter of exceptionality. Nor did it demonstrate in any way how the educational and social benefits of racial diversity or avoidance of racial isolation are more likely to be achieved at a school that is 50 percent white and 50 percent Asian-American, which would qualify as diverse under Seattles plan, than at a school that is 30 percent Asian-American, 25 percent African-American, 25 percent Latino, and 20 percent white, which under Seattles definition would be racially concentrated. Cf. 458 U. S., at 472, n.15. ); internal quotation marks omitted). Just as diversity in higher education was deemed compelling in Grutter, diversity in public primary and secondary schoolswhere there is even more to gainmust be, a fortiori, a compelling state interest. We granted certiorari. Second, the plurality downplays the importance of Swann and related cases by frequently describing their relevant statements as dicta. These criticisms, however, miss the main point. Despite this decision, the three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit ruled that the District use of race failed to meet the standards in Grutter and Gratz. One schoolGarfieldis more or less in the center of Seattle. What other numbers are the boards to use as a starting point? See Seattle School District, Ethnic Count 2005-2006, at 8. Brief for Respondent at 3334. We relied on the fact that Congress has continuously since 1862 segregated its schools in the District of Columbia); Brief for Appellees in Briggs v. Elliott, O.T. 1952, No. The school districts in these cases voluntarily adopted student assignment plans that rely upon race to determine which public schools certain children may attend. PICS cites Supreme Court jurisprudence for the proposition that there is no compelling government interest in adjusting general societal discrimination. In 2000, Federal Judge John Heyburn, after finding that the JCPS school system did not need to be under a court-ordered desegregation policy, ruled that race could not be used for student assignment placement in the JCPS school system in regard to their magnet school programs. Rather, this Court must assess independently the nature of the interest asserted and the evidence to support it in order to determine whether it qualifies as compelling under our precedents. But our precedent has recognized that de jure discrimination can be present even in the absence of racially explicit laws. See, e.g., post, at 21, 4849, 66. Most of the dissents criticisms of todays result can be traced to its rejection of the color-blind Constitution. See id., at 1032 (discussing other successful black schools); Walker, Can Institutions Care? Ohio adds that a district may object to the enrollment of a native student in an adjacent or other district in order to maintain an appropriate racial balance. 3313.98 (F)(1)(a). Section 4. Public Schools, 330 F.Supp. Therefore, as a general rule, all race-based government decisionmakingregardless of contextis unconstitutional. 3, p.1617 (It is by such practical considerations based on experience rather than by theoretical inconsistencies that the question of equal protection is to be answered (quoting Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U. S. 110 (1949))); Brief for Appellees on Reargument in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1953, No. Primary and secondary schools are where the education of this Nations children begins, where each of us begins to absorb those values we carry with us to the end of our days. 3 1996 Memorandum 58; Hampton I, supra, at 768, n.30. The District also contends that the racial tiebreaker was necessary because other race-neutral activities were inadequate to achieve their compelling interests. . Adarand, supra, at 227. When a court subjects governmental action to strict scrutiny, it cannot construe ambiguities in favor of the State. Just prior to the plans implementation, for example, 4 of Seattles 11 high schools were imbalanced, i.e., almost exclusively black or almost exclusively white. By 1979, only two were out of balance. By 1980 only Cleveland remained out of balance (as the board defined it) and that by a mere two students. He also wrote about the unsettled debate concerning whether racial balance or diversity has a positive effect on educational outcomes. The lesson of history, see ante, at 39 (plurality opinion), is not that efforts to continue racial segregation are constitutionally indistinguishable from efforts to achieve racial integration. Was it de facto? Its view of the law rests either upon a denial of the distinction between exclusionary and inclusive use of race-conscious criteria in the context of the Equal Protection Clause, or upon such a rigid application of its test that the distinction loses practical significance. B1, B5. of Los Angeles, 458 U. S. 527, 535536 (1982) ([S]tate courts of California continue to have an obligation under state law to order segregated school districts to use voluntary desegregation techniques, whether or not there has been a finding of intentional segregation. The plan requires all nonmagnet schools to maintain a minimum black enrollment of 15 percent, and a maximum black enrollment of 50 percent. 1725, 2841. of Ed., 72 F.Supp. of City School Dist. 1, 458 U. S. 457, 472, n. 15 (1982). In the present cases, by contrast, race is not considered as part of a broader effort to achieve exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints, id., at 330; race, for some students, is determinative standing alone. Id., at 3839, 82. Petitioner Parents Involved in Community Schools objected to Seattles most recent plan under the State and Federal Constitutions. Click the card to flip Definition 1 / 8 Seattle School District instituted a "tiebreaker" plan which placed determined student placements on the consideration of a predetermined racial balance of Boston v. Board of Education, O.T. 1967, No. 05908, at 224a225a, 253a259a, 307a. Indeed, the consequences of the approach the Court takes today are serious. The plurality opinion is at least open to the interpretation that the Constitution requires school districts to ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling. I have long adhered to the view that a decision to exclude a member of a minority because of his race is fundamentally different from a decision to include a member of a minority for that reason. Segregation in the South grew up and is kept going because and only because the white race has wanted it that wayan incontrovertible fact which itself hardly consorts with equality).

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